philosophy
I am interested in arguments, in both senses of the term: how to make them, how to evaluate them; how to resolve them, which ones are worth having. Many of the arguments I've studied in the most depth are in metaphysics and the philosophy of science, but I am increasingly thinking about arguments themselves: about epistemology, philosophy of language, and logic. Having grown up with two competitive older brothers, I know arguments are no fun unless you can agree on who won.
Within metaphysics and the philosophy of science I have focused so far on two interlocking sets of issues: one surrounding natural law and inference to the best explanation, and another surrounding the status of metaphysics itself and the (im)possibility of ontological disagreement. Both inquiries led me to think about the role of theoretical virtues like simplicity and parsimony, as well as the broader question of what makes explanation "work" and what the limits of explanation might be.
Increasingly I am also considering the linguistic and conceptual aspects of disagreement, in politics as well as in philosophy. A hopefully forthcoming review of Herman Cappelen's Fixing Language will express some of my skepticism about projects of redefinition and conceptual engineering, echoing Cappelen's own points about the overproduction of verbal disputes and characterizing ameliorative analysis as broadly but unjustifiably taking connotations for granted regardless of changes in denotation.
I have a master's degree from Tufts University. There I passed comprehensive exams in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language; took advanced coursework on topics like personal identity, causation, modal logic, metametaphysics, and the philosophy of David Lewis; and served as a teaching assistant for "Knowing and Being", "Language and Mind", and the undergraduate logic course. In August 2018 I began the Ph.D. program in philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.
Within metaphysics and the philosophy of science I have focused so far on two interlocking sets of issues: one surrounding natural law and inference to the best explanation, and another surrounding the status of metaphysics itself and the (im)possibility of ontological disagreement. Both inquiries led me to think about the role of theoretical virtues like simplicity and parsimony, as well as the broader question of what makes explanation "work" and what the limits of explanation might be.
Increasingly I am also considering the linguistic and conceptual aspects of disagreement, in politics as well as in philosophy. A hopefully forthcoming review of Herman Cappelen's Fixing Language will express some of my skepticism about projects of redefinition and conceptual engineering, echoing Cappelen's own points about the overproduction of verbal disputes and characterizing ameliorative analysis as broadly but unjustifiably taking connotations for granted regardless of changes in denotation.
I have a master's degree from Tufts University. There I passed comprehensive exams in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of language; took advanced coursework on topics like personal identity, causation, modal logic, metametaphysics, and the philosophy of David Lewis; and served as a teaching assistant for "Knowing and Being", "Language and Mind", and the undergraduate logic course. In August 2018 I began the Ph.D. program in philosophy at the University of Notre Dame.
